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Gary Shapiro
THE OWL OF MINERVA AND THE COLORS
OF THE NIGHT
Hegel is known to many readers mainly for a few striking figurative
passages which he himself excluded from the central structures
of his major texts as extrinsic remarks. His mature system justifies
this exclusion by claiming that philosophy operates in the realm of
the pure concept, having surpassed the sensuous narrative images of
art and religion. Nevertheless, the very forcefulness of the passages
themselves indicates that the mature Hegel may never have peacefully
aufgehoben the young man who believed in 1796 that philosophy, in
order to resume its original role as educator of mankind, must become
aesthetic, mythological, and poetic. (I am assuming that Hegel either
wrote "the earliest system-program of German idealism" or endorsed
its principles.) A reading of the famous elegiac passage in the "Preface"
to the Philosophy of Right suggests not only problems of meaning, but
of philosophical rhetoric:
One more word about giving instruction as to what the world ought
to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late to
give it. As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality is
already there cut and dried after its process of formation has been
completed. The teaching of the concept, which is also history's inescapable
lesson, is that it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal first appears
over against the real and that the ideal apprehends this same real world
in its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual
realm. When philosophy paints its gray in gray, then has a shape of
life grown old. By philosophy's gray in gray it cannot be rejuvenated
but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with
the falling of the dusk.1
The first focus of attention here is usually on the mood of philosophical
resignation in which completion of a rational development leaves no
room for action or advice. Theory must necessarily give up any Utopian
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or activist pretentions it may have harbored once it sees that it can
only describe what has been. Despite the fact that Hegelian actuality
(Wirklichkeit) is the result of a rational and dialectical process, ascetic
renunciation of any relation to action puts Hegel in the strange company
of nineteenth century positivists and empiricists; it also establishes a
tone fundamentally different from classical European political philoso-
phy of thinkers like Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, a tone which
Marx, provoked by Hegel, was to revive. The statement can also be
read on a scale much larger than the political, in which it suggests
a resigned acceptance of the completion of Western philosophy and
civilization. Hegel is notorious for his view that spirit (Geist), the
fundamental reality, has completed itself through the self-knowledge
which it attains in his system of philosophy. That he sometimes speaks
of his enterprise as a Wissen or Wissenschaft (knowledge, science, or
wisdom) suggests how far he has come from the Socratic conception
of philosophy as always characterized by a lack of that which it loves.
It would be intriguing to explore these themes. Such exploration
would involve a more thorough knowledge of what Hegel understands
by end, completion, and fulfillment when he speaks of political life
and the higher forms of spirit—art, religion, and philosophy. We might
even be led by such an inquiry into Hegel's meaning to see his claims
as historically and philosophically plausible and to reconsider our own
resistance to believing that we live in a deepening twilight. What I
wish to do, however, is to call attention to the manner in which Hegel
speaks of Minerva's owl and to juxtapose both the manner and the
substance of his thought about the twilight of philosophy and civilization
with some of Hölderlin's dichterisch and Heidegger's denkerisch medita-
tions on similar themes. For if Hegel has announced the coming of
the night, Hölderlin and Heidegger have sought to make the night
their very own territory and to comprehend it from within. If Hegel
has rather gingerly allowed himself to lapse into that famous figurative
discourse of the owl and the gray in gray, he has immediately weakened
his remarks by calling them "external and subjective" in the very next
paragraph; Heidegger has had no hesitation—no shame, many profes-
sional philosophers would say—in speaking seriously of the most extreme
sayings of modern poets about the night of the modern world and
in making his own writings into poetic meditations on the night. I
hope that the significance of these juxtapositions will become apparent
by looking at some internal problems of the Hegelian perspective; and
this long way around may yield a deeper sense of the questions which
I began by deferring.
There is something strange about Hegel's "owl saying" and a similar
and more extended complex of images of the sun, day, and night
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which appear in the Phihsophy of History. The strangeness has to do
both with what the statements mean and with the status of such
metaphorical statements in apparently crucial places in the Hegelian
system. The strangeness intensifies when we see that these are not
two independent themes in this case; they bring us back to one place
in which we must puzzle over a single metaphorical network. Our first
aporia has to do with whether these sayings are only "external and
subjective remarks." It is not difficult to see why Hegel should call
them that. In a complete system of philosophy, validity is attained
only through what Hegel calls "the labor of the concept," the complex
dialectical progression through a variety of increasingly adequate posi-
tions; there is no shortcut to wisdom through intuition. When Hegel
explicitly discusses questions of style and imagery in art and philosophy,
he leaves no doubt that philosophical claims to truth and adequacy
must be sheerly conceptual, having left behind, or at least aufgehoben,
the representational and imagistic thinking of art and religion. Yet
there is some truth in the notion that Hegel's own narrative of the
spirit's development is a kind of Bildungsroman; this point has been
made suggestively by Josiah Royce, one of the only Anglo-American
philosophers to see Hegel sympathetically within the context of Germanic
culture, and it has recently been elaborated by M. H. Abrams in his
study of romantic poetry and thought.2 Despite this, Hegel is quite
definite in his Lectures on Aesthetics when he claims that there cannot
be an epic of the world spirit because the universality of its subject
destroys the particularity of situation and action which are indispensable
to poetry.3 "Gray in gray," "dusk," "Minerva's owl"—these are all
metaphorical descriptions of the end of culture or spirit and the task
of the philosopher. In the same lectures Hegel sees metaphor as the
vaguest, least adequate form of poetic language because it points to
an indeterminate series of relations or adumbrates without clarifying
a new meaning which can never come to presence within metaphorical
discourse.
To accept these considerations, all drawn from Hegelian texts, would
reinforce philosophy's traditional claim that metaphors are no argu-
ments; having accepted them we could return with good conscience
to the exacting yet relatively familiar ground of conceptual clarification.
Let us suppose for a moment, however, that Hegel has made good
his claim to have completed the ideological development of spirit to
self-knowledge. In that case, philosophical language seems to have only
two possibilities before it. One is to continue to circle in the self-contained
system through which thought thinks about itself: this is Hegel's fleshing
out and humanization of Aristotle's divinity with the concrete history
of art, religion, and philosophy. The other is to say those things which
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are appropriate to our being at the end of spirit's career. It is the
second kind of discourse which Hegel seems to be venturing on in
the "owl" passage and in the comparison of the course of history to
the course of the day, where spiritual enlightenment comes only with
natural night (in the Philosophy of History). If we are in the time of
completion (or if Hegel's contemporary readers were), or if we have
reached a kind of eternal validity through a temporal progression,
then we can become conscious of being at or past the end. For Hegel
to return to the figure of night in describing this condition becomes
a matter of some importance, although to speak in this way, to fall
back into metaphor, runs counter to fundamental directions of his
system. The exclusion of metaphor is justified by philosophy's need
to achieve fulfillment in its own terms; but if such a completion is
actually attained then a return to metaphor may be permissible and
even necessary if we are to speak appropriately of our new situation.
Perhaps Hegel's image is so straightforward that it need not engage
us in large questions about whether and how metaphor and poetic
thought ought to be allowed to enter into philosophical discourse.
Although Hegel's images may appear innocent enough, they carry with
them a large network of historical and poetic associations. Jacques
Derrida has pointed to the connection between philosophical thinking
about metaphor and the primary image of the sun in his essay on
"White Mythology." It is not just the prevalence of these images—as
in the Platonic cave and sun, the light-metaphysics of the scholastics,
Descartes' "natural light," the Enlightenment—which is significant, but
the way in which they appear when philosophers are attempting to
delineate the structure of metaphorical discourse itself. Hegel's text
not only exemplifies Derrida's thesis but, appropriately for Hegel,
encapsulates his own historical sense of the use of these images.
In the short "Preface" from which our central quotation comes, Hegel
has spoken of the relation of Plato's Republic to the actuality of the
Greek polis suggesting that, like his own work, it is a nocturnal reflection
on the doings of the day. If Hegel had cared to enlarge on the point,
he could have mentioned the dramatic setting of the dialogue—a long
conversation into the night following an innovative religious festival
which signals a change in Athenian mores. As Hegel's translator notes,
Hegel's "gray in gray" is probably an echo of Goethe (whom Hegel
had already referred to a few pages back):
Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie
Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum.
[Gray, dear friend is all theory
And green is life's golden tree.]4
280Philosophy and Literature
Yet if Hegel is summoning up Mephistopheles, who is engaged here
in leading a novice student astray, then one fairly simple reading of
the "owl passage" is called into question. This straightforward inter-
pretation to which Hegel seems close in the Philosophy of History would
involve a contrast between the parallel courses of the natural day and
spiritual development: in this parallelism natural day with its bright
sun corresponds to the indefinite and primitive beginnings of spirit,
while natural night is a time of spiritual completion, self-knowledge,
and enlightenment. The course of the day, a natural cycle, is here
a metaphor for the course of history which is governed by human
and divine intentions. In this scheme Europe, the home of the Germanic
peoples who fulfill the destiny of spirit, is the Abendland; it is the place
of the setting sun, the conclusion of the rational progress of world
history, and the place where spirit is fully self-conscious. It is in this
twilight that the owl of Minerva can take flight. Yet the neat parallelism
and inversion of this reading are undercut by Hegel's melancholy tone
and his statement that it is philosophy itself which paints a gray in
gray. The suggestion is that we may be living in a night-time which
is not only a historical conclusion but a time of spiritual uncertainty
and confusion. The very uncertainty of Hegel's metaphor—do we live
in a time of light or darkness?—refers us back to his hesitations about
whether metaphorical speech can be philosophically appropriate; but
the problem of metaphor in philosophy leads us back to the question
of what kind of age we are living in.
This set of questions is both complicated and enriched by Hegel's
radically historical sensibility. What other writers often represent as
a timeless opposition between philosophical and poetic discourse is for
Hegel a dialectical and historical process. When Socrates refers to "the
ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry" he represents it as
a dynastic feud, like that of the Hatfields and McCoys in which the
sons take up a constant struggle; there is no trace of the sense of
development through conflict which can be found in Hesiod and
Aeschylus. Hegel's saying that "philosophy is its own time comprehended
in thought" could be generalized: every historical era has its appropriate
form of thought and discourse. It is naively unhistorical to expect
to find sophisticated prose in early Persia or a Biblical consciousness
in the modern state. In the Philosophy of History Hegel remarks on
the confusions of modern historians who take Greek poetry to be history
while casting aside the labors of Roman historians and replacing them
with their own poetic inventions.5 The point of the remark is that
Greece is a poetic culture and Rome a prosaic one. To take as accurate
history the Homeric poems, or even the "histories" of Herodotus and
Thucydides, which we are now accustomed to read as structured by
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mythic and tragic patterns, is to misread the Greeks. To deny the
Romans' prosaic sense of fact is to compound one's error. Hegel is
not taking sides on the vexed question of the trustworthiness of primary
historical documents. He is referring us to a complex historical scheme
in which there is a series of elaborate correspondences between cultural
and discursive forms reminiscent of Vico's theory. In the Philosophy
of History the succession reads in this way: pre-historic, primitive cultures
discourse by means of animistic myth; the oriental world achieves a
dualistic, cause and effect understandingwhich is expressed in chronicle;
the Greeks are mature poets who beautify the natural and historical
world; the Romans see history as a succession of intelligible human
actions; while the Germanic peoples, with the flowering of philosophical
consciousness from the scholastics to Hegel, achieve a synthesis of poetry's
speculative daring and history's (or prose's) vigorous sense of fact.
The pattern here is an alternation of poetic and prosaic consciousness
in which each repetition of the primal pair occurs at a higher level
of consciousness. As Hegel points out in his Aesthetics, there are crucial
differences between primitive, "natural" poetry and poetry which,
following the development of prosaic consciousness, is aware of its
own struggle with prose.6 While it is usual to read Hegel's philosophy
of history as organized around a final culmination, the parallels with
Vico and the tentative turn toward metaphor at the "end" of history
may hint at the possibility of a recorso. Whether such cyclical repetition
or even some more radical novelty is possible for Hegel is a matter
for dispute. In the Philosophy of History Hegel contrasts the cyclical
movement of the sun and the progressive movement toward culmination
which is history: "The history of the world travels from east to west,
for Europe is absolutely the end of history, Asia the beginning . . .
although the earth forms a sphere, history performs no circle round
it, but has on the contrary a determinate east, Asia."7 This seems clear
enough. But what does it mean to speak of the absolute end of history?
Two plausible interpretations present themselves. History may be at
an end in the sense that it has realized certain principles which were
immanent in its development and which, now realized, may be expected
to govern the future. The achievement of universal freedom, recognition,
and consciousness in the modern state would seem to be a foundation
for all future social and political activity. Yet Hegel may be speaking
not of history in the most general sense of that which happens, or
even of that which is noted and interpreted, but of history in the
more specific meaning which it acquires in his conceiving of it as "the
story of freedom." To suggest that history is the story of freedom may
leave some logical space for the narration of other stories. The principles
of the modern state, on this reading, need not determine the future
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except as the starting point of a new narrative. Hegel's teleology lends
itself to either interpretation. History, and more generally the develop-
ment of spirit überhaupt, is the realization and working out of a purpose:
the actualization of free and rational self-consciousness. Is this a purpose
among several possible ones or is it the purpose, the only one which
human beings can pursue? Or might there be some process of more
or less continuous change in which human beings depart from their
earlier nature and achievements to aim at something new or even to
live free of any teleological pattern? It is such questions which we
will find Heidegger pursuing in his reading of Trakl's poetry of the
night.
If Hegel is the philosopher of our age of evening, his contemporary
Hölderlin is its poet. The themes of presence and absence, of a
completion which still leaves us melancholy are the explicit themes
of his work, while Hegel touches on them only to leave them intriguingly
indeterminate. What they thought of each other's work in their mature
periods poses a series of the most complex problems in intellectual
history. Both began their careers with a revolutionary and prophetic
urge to contribute to a new religion of art which would overcome
the abstractions of traditional philosophy and religion. Yet Hegel finally
came to subordinate art to philosophy while Hölderlin thought himself
deeper into the night-time in which the old gods have fled and the
new have not yet arrived. The apparent discontinuity can be emplotted
as dialogue, however. Hölderlin's sense of absence and expectation
of the holy is a critique of Hegel's notion that all that there can be
of the spirit has manifested itself. Hegel's devaluation of the metaphorical
and symbolic mode in poetry is an indirect commentary on Hölderlin's
condensed, paratactic prophecies. While Hegel's philosophy is, in part,
an attempt to overcome poetic and narrative modes by the articulation
of a single absolute discourse, Hölderlin's poetry contains a critique
of the philosophical ideals of absolute presence and of the dialectical
development which allegedly leads to it.
For our purposes the most interesting locus of this dialogue is
Hölderlin's own treatment of the themes of day and night in poems
like Bread and Wine. These works were all written before any of Hegel's
major texts but they share with them that image-complex of a new
sun rising which was common in the revolutionary era. Bread and Wine
itself begins and ends with night and its central strophe speaks of
a time of the gods' bright presence. Night's ambiguity between restful
completion and a new, strange beginning is itself the beginning of
the poem. "AU around the city rests" are its first words: men are
comfortable and at home. Given the radically historical nature of the
whole poem, with its meditation on our loss of the shining manifestation
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of the gods, Hölderlin's description of the city-dwellers' drowsy comfort
can be read as an account of those who think that they live at the
end of history:
Satt gehn heim von Freuden des Tags zu ruhen die Menschen,
Und Gewinn und Verlust wäget ein sinniges Haupt
Wohlzufrieden zu Haus
[Sated with the day's pleasures, men go home to rest,
and a pensive head weighs up gain and loss contentedly
in the house] 8
Yet there are apparently random interruptions in the quiet of the
bourgeois night, a "distant music of strings," a breeze, and the mysterious
moon. These lead to the appearance of Night, depicted as a goddess
who is said to be not very much concerned about us while wonderful
in her favor. Night is not our possession, she is not simply the conclusion
of our day, but a power to whom song should be consecrated "because
she is sacred to those astray (den Irrenden) and to the dead." Hegel's
natural night is illuminated by man's "inner sun; and when in the
evening he contemplates this he esteems it more highly than the original
external sun. For now he stands in a conscious relation to his spirit,
and therefore a free relation."9 Hölderlin is suggesting that the weighing
and measuring which leads to satisfaction with one's own internal sun
misses the numinous sense of otherness to be found in day, if we
are strong enough for it, or in night, if we are weaker. Unless we
venture outside the house we shall miss the charm and terror of both
day and night. Our discourse of the night will not be the autobiographical
summing up of a self-contained individual, even one imagined on the
gigantic scale of Hegel's Geist. We shall consecrate songs to night but
she in return "must grant oblivion, and grant the sacredly drunken,
grant us the onrushing word which will be sleepless like lovers, grant
us the fuller cup and more reckless life, holy remembrance, too, to
remain wakeful by night."
Hölderlin continues to use the pair of night and day to set up a
complex dialectic of presence and absence. In its form the poem seems
to point to an absolute presence, for in its very center, equidistant
from the images of night and sleep in the first and last strophes, the
poet announces a theophany:
Möglichst dulden die Himmlischen dies; dann aber in Wahrheit
Kommen sie selbst, und gewohnt werden die Menschen des Glüks
Und des Tags und zu schaun die Offenbaren, das Antliz
[This the heavenly tolerate as far as they can; but then
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they appear in truth, in person, and men grow used to
good fortune, to day, and to the sight of those now manifest.]
Yet although men are in the presence of the gods they do not really
see them. When nun (now) is repeated three times at the end of the
strophe it is not to mark the presence which we associate with the
temporal present but it suggests the gap between our present lack,
which requires names and images, and the full sense of presence that
might have been. Hegel's treatment of the discourse of the "now" in
his Phenomenology of Mind is surprisingly appropriate. Sense-certainty
or immediate sensation is thought to be the richest and fullest form
of knowledge and truth; yet the very act of naming the now demonstrates
that it has passed. The attempt to articulate or grasp the present moment
requires language and language carries with it a set of abstractions
and universale which are just the opposite of the presence originally
intended. Hegel's first and most primitive illustration of this dialectic
is the alternation between "now it is night" and "now it is day."10
For both Hegel and Hölderlin, then, immediate perception is a kind
of hypothetical moment which must be postulated as the origin of
our fall into language; yet while Hölderlin holds out the hope that
some further historical movement may lead to the recapture of the
experience, Hegel offers his own interpretation of the Greek mysteries:
In this connection we may answer those who insist on the truth and
certainty of the reality of objects of sense, by saying that they had better
be sent back to the most elementary school of wisdom, the ancient
Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus; they have not yet learnt
the inner secret of the eating of bread and the drinking of wine.11
Even the animals have learned the nullity of sensible objects, Hegel
points out, because they do not hesitate to devour them. What the
reversal of certainty suggests is that it is "the divine nature of language"
which is at work; the presence which spirit will achieve will be one
in which it speaks to itself, about itself, through its own discourse,
not its presence to another.
Hölderlin's paradoxical invocation of the gods' presence is flanked
by strophes in which the decay of Greek art is prominent. If immediate
perception and language cannot recapture presence, perhaps great art
and culture can.
Aber wo sind sie? wo blühn die Bekannten, die Kronen des Festes?
Thebe welkt und Athen; rauschen die Waffen nicht mehr
In Olympia, nicht die goldnen Wagen des Kampfspiels,
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Und bekränzen sich denn nimmer die Schiffe Korinths?
Warum schweigen auch sie, die alten heiigen Theater?
Warum freuet sich denn nicht der geweihete Tanz?
[But where are they? Where do the well-known
thrive, the festival's crowns? Thebes wilts,
and Athens; do then the weapons no longer
sound at Olympia, nor the golden chariots of
the games, and are the ships of Corinth no
longer, then, wreathed with flowers? Why
are they silent too, the ancient and sacred
theaters? Why does the hallowed dance not
rejoice?]
The decay of Greek art shows the impossibility of recapturing presence.
In a time of absence we can at best track down the signs and traces
(Zeichen and Spuren) of the gods who have flown. Such concern for
traces may eventually lead to the strength for presence, at which point
the gods may manifest themselves again. Hölderlin's complex of day
and night, presence and absence, plays on the cyclical aspect of the
solar day. Hegel's discussion of Greek art (Kunstreligion) in the Phenome-
nology sees it not as a falling away from presence but as a dialectic
which, like the courses of the sun and human history, moves from
an illusory external presence to a genuine spiritual one. The progress
begins with the attempt to represent the gods in a visible and external
form. Such art is necessarily abstract for it obviously fails to capture
the living presence of the gods while leaving obscure the role of human
beings in the artistic process. The path of the progress consists in
a gradual abandonment of the notion of divine manifestation, until
comedy completes the "depopulation of heaven" and leaves the poet,
his audience, and the actors at one in a serene sense of their own
power; this anticipates the final presence in which Hegel's readers achieve
an identity with absolute spirit.12
The contrast which I have been sketching has this form: Hegel sees
a completion of full presence being attained through an increasingly
self-conscious human discourse, while Hölderlin represents language,
art, and poetry as a series of losses and attempts at recovery. Yet Hegel's
completion has the ambiguity of the twilight in which Minerva's owl
takes to wing, while Hölderlin's night anticipates a return of the light.
In this opposition between poetry and philosophy can be found variant
conceptions of the nature of poetry itself. Hölderlin's lines in the seventh
strophe are famous.
. . . und wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit?
Aber sie sind, sagst du, wie des Weingotts heilige priester,
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Welche von Land zu Land zogen in heiliger Nacht.
[. . . and what is the use of poets at a time of
dearth? But they are, you say, like those holy
priests of the wine-god who travelled from country
to country in holy night.]
As Paul de Man suggests, the question is ambiguous in that it may
be asking either for the purpose of poets in thL· time of dearth or for
the purpose of poets within temporal existence in general, pervaded
as it is by transience and lack.13 The answer, tentative though it is
because attributed in the poem to Hölderlin's friend Heinze, seems
to suggest that whether it is the night of time or our time of night
or both, there is a kind of meaning in what poets do which is somehow
successive in form. Hegel's conception of poetry's development had
not yet been articulated, but was already in the air in the form of
the evolutionary accounts of poetry adumbrated by Schelling and
Schlegel. For Hegel, the inner history of poetry is a progression from
metaphysical and symbolic suggestion of a distant divinity to the mode
of romance and the genre of drama in which poetic discourse approaches
spirit's self-knowledge. For Hegel the spirit of poetry passes from land
to land—from Oriental symbolism, to Greek drama, to "romantic" poets
like Shakespeare and Goethe—in order to arrive at the "inner sun"
which illuminates the end of history; for Hölderlin the journey of
the poets is a kind of passionate preservation and endurance which
has no internally necessary goal. The wine-god, Dionysus, is sung at
night because his traces keep alive our intimations of a greater presence.
Hegel, invoking Dionysus in the Phenomenology, says that truth is "the
Bacchanalian revel where none is sober," an absolute union of motion
and rest which is strictly identical with spirit's celebration of itself. Here
the drunkenness of truth is a presence of the god in us which leaves
no room for wandering through the night.
I am suggesting that some of the most significant work of both
Hölderlin and Hegel should be read not simply as "poetry" or "philoso-
phy" but as a discussion or dialectic between poetry and philosophy.
By focusing this Auseinandersetzung around the metaphor of the evening,
and the legitimacy of metaphorical discourse itself, I have attempted
to suggest the radically historical character of the discussion. These
themes, latent but powerful in Hegel and Hölderlin, become the explicit
concerns of Martin Heidegger's essay "Language in the Poem: Situating
Georg Trakl's Poem." Heidegger's essay is the intersection of the two
temporalities of poetry and thinking. Heidegger sees Trakl as "historical
in the highest sense because he sings of the destiny (Geschick) which
propels mankind into its still withheld nature, and saves it" (p. 8O).14
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As a prophetic poet, Trakl must be situated in the night-time of which
he sings. But thinking too is determined by this same night and so
any dialogue or discussion between thinking and poetry itself acquires
a different meaning in the evening (p. 51). Heidegger repeatedly quotes
Trakl's line, "Abend wechselt Sinn und Bild" [Evening changes sense
and image] , to suggest not only the point of Trakl's poetry and thinking's
response to time, but to justify his own strategy in reading the poems.
Part of what Heidegger is doing by calling his own enterprise thinking
rather than philosophy is attempting to dispense with the concept of
an eternal sophia which the traditional term carries with it. Thinking
does not aim at an absolute possession of or identity with its object
which would bring history to its close. Therefore it cannot succeed
in transforming temporality marked by the rising and setting of the
sun, into an inextinguishable internal sun. Like Vico's primal poets,
the founders of the gentile races, Heidegger is impressed by the otherness
of the sky and the gods who alternately conceal themselves in and
reveal themselves through it. The consequent reading of Trakl's poetry
aims at juxtaposing this sense of simultaneous disclosure and hiddenness
with the history of philosophy which aims at making everything manifest.
In another essay Heidegger says that "this manifestness of Being within
metaphysics may even be at the same time the extreme oblivion of
Being."15
Acccording to Heidegger the site (Ort) or unspoken central source
of Trakl's poetry is the apartness (Abgeschiedenheit) of a wandering
in the world's night. To depart from what has been accomplished during
the day, to wander in the night, is to make or begin to make a new
beginning. Like Hegel, Heidegger sees the evening as a time which
marks the completion of philosophy, although he gives a different
reading of its history. For Heidegger this history revolves around the
search for the absolutely present, and so leads from the Platonic Ideas
through the Cartesian cogito to Hegel's manifest spirit and finally to
Nietzsche's Will-to-Power. The completion of this history, however, is
not the completion of history as such which is, apparently, always
structured by absence and concealment as well as presence. The time
of philosophy's completion, then, is not just an external evening but
a real one in which we can observe the tragic consequences of a hybris
which has attempted to illuminate all of Being by its own resources.
Poetry and thinking that are no longer subject to the illusory aim
of possessing or coinciding with the present will accept the absences
of the evening. Their task is to make the evening their own in the
sense of sympathetically being with it or in it rather than consuming
it. Heidegger speaks of this making own as Ereignis, which Albert
Hofstadter helpfully translates as "enownment." The extended "situa-
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tion" of Trakl's poetry is a discussion between philosophy and poetry
on the enownment of the evening. Just as Trakl is not simply writing
about the night, but speaking from it, Heidegger is not merely explicating
Trakl's image (as if he had a ready technique for reading all poems),
but speaks of Trakl's poetry from his own situation in the evening
of thinking.
Heidegger's discussion of Trakl's metaphors—the blue game (das
blaue Wild), the pond of the evening, the ghostly, pain, and death—not
only aims at clarifying the meaning of the poet's work but seeks to
exhibit that metaphorical discourse in the appropriate language of the
night. Here there is an interesting coincidence between a Heideggerian
and a psychoanalytic reading of Trakl. In a recent monograph on
the poet, Maire Jaanus Kurrik has suggested that Trakl's work exhibits
a progressive escape from the ordinary constraints of sense because
it is an increasingly direct expression of primary process.16 Heidegger
says that "language speaks" in another essay on a Trakl poem. The
idea is that language, liberated from our willfull attempts to impose
sense and purpose on it, will reveal deep and unexpected connections
of things if we will only iisten to it. Paratactic poetry like Trakl's seems
to show in its very form that it is liberated from the constraints of
grammar imposed by the will. For Heidegger this move is more historical
than pathological. It can be made only when the willful aim at presence
has exhausted itself and the desire to dominate language has vanished.
The night which emerges in Trakl's poetry is shot through with
bright hallucinatory colors, and populated by a blue game or deer,
the departed, and the ghostly. The colors of Trakl's night are interesting
if only for the fact that they are colors. Night might ordinarily be
expected to be dark and obscure; in fact a typical Trakl poem is a
dazzling succession of colors in the night. The contrast suggests a
distinction between this night and the ones of which Hegel and Hölderlin
speak. Hegel's "gray in gray" recalls not only Mephistopheles in Faust
but Goethe's theory of color which he adopted for his own Philosophy
of Nature. For Goethe and Hegel the primary optical phenomena are
the polarities of light and darkness, not the colors into which Newton
had shown white light could be decomposed. Light and dark have
a false, immediate synthesis in gray and a true reconciliation in color,
which requires a medium. For Hegel the evening must be colorless
because there is not enough light left to create color. External night
and internal sun stand at the end of history's colorful pageant and
represent its dissolution into the primary pair. The connection of color
with life (as in Goethe's "und grün des Lebens goldner Baum" ) reinforces
the melancholy of the Hegelian night.
Although Heidegger does not discuss the general significance of color
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within Trakl's poetry he does make some important comments on blue
or the blue, which is a frequent enough image to be obsessive in Trakl.
(The distance between a Heideggerian and a psychoanalytic reading
will become evident here if we keep in mind that the latter tends
to attribute Trakl's blue to its associations with his incestuous relations
with his sister.) Speaking of the blue game that wanders through Trakl's
night, Heidegger asks for the source of the blue game's blueness. The
problem is how something could receive a color from the dark of
the night. Here Heidegger suggests a closer reading, pointing out that
while the night is dark (dunkel) it is not necessarily characterized by
gloom or obscurity (Finsternis). Darkness has its own kind of clarity,
and "Clarity (Helle) sheltered in the dark is blueness." Things are not
ordinarily invisible in the night but their appearance is altered, or
as Trakl says, "Evening changes sense and image." The scope of the
alteration can be measured by Heidegger's association of clarity with
"the sound that calls out of the shelter of stillness" by appealing to
the etymology of Helle. Trakl's blueness is at once the call to which
we can listen in the night, if we are ready to listen to language's own
speech, and the color of that night itself. Other poems which Heidegger
cites speak of "holy blueness." Yet Heidegger says that, "The blue
is no image (BiId) of the holy. Blueness itself is the holy, on account
of its gathering depth which manifests itself only in its covering itself
up" (p. 44). The point here has both to do with the night and its
language. Blue could be (and is in some poets) a present, sensory image
of something else (like the holy) which is absent or at least not sensuously
concrete. Metaphorical language, on such an understanding, aims at
making present that which is absent, like the words invoked by Hölderlin
in Bread and Wine which "must now arise like flowers." Hegel criticizes
metaphor just because it can only point towards the idea of presence
in an indefinite way while never actually achieving it.17 Heidegger's
point is that at least in some poems—in Trakl's poetry of the night,
in any case—such discourse is not simply an instance of a dialectic
of presence and absence but may itself embody that dialectic. Blue
is not the present substitute for an absent holiness; it is holiness just
because it has no absence without presence and no presence without
absence. The night on the one hand and its colors and flaming spirit
on the other do not stand for something other than themselves but
by their very play disclose what is.
In Heidegger's "thinking" discussion with Trakl's poetry, it is no
longer possible to make a clear distinction between the questions of
what the night means and how or to what extent philosophy (or thinking)
can itself be a form of metaphorical discourse. The site is the night,
the night is a time of both presence and absence, and this is the nature
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of the language which is its valid speech. The contrast with some other
ways of understanding metaphor is instructive. Many moderns have
tended to make metaphor the essential force of poetry, contrasting
its richness and plurality of meaning with the schematic abstractions
of merely discursive prose. Hegel's early devaluation of metaphor finds
it inferior to the fuller dialectic of the epic, the lyric, and the drama
which in turn is aufgehoben in the definitive syntheses by which philosophy
makes the spirit present to itself. Both the modern inflation of metaphor
and Hegel's critique are based on a metaphysics of presence. They
also sort themselves out historically. Hegel's judgment is contributory
to his own absolute idealism which appears as the all-inclusive culmination
of art and philosophy; the modern turn to metaphor comes as part
of a search to replace the grandiose failures of traditional philosophy
and religion with a fullness of image and meaning.
Heidegger's own view of poetic language parallels his notion of truth
as aletheia or disclosedness. There is no truth or manifestation without
its background of concealment and therefore there is no unqualified
or absolute manifestation. In his essay on "Plato's Doctrine of Truth"
Heidegger shows how the Platonic idea of presence is tied to the allegory
of the cave and the sun which charts an itinerary from the land of
shadows to the shining presence which makes all other presence possible.
(Whether focusing on the indirect and mythical nature of the discussions
of presence within the Platonic dialogues would qualify this "doctrine"
is a question which Heidegger does not consider.) In commenting on
one of Hölderlin's poems, Heidegger uses the sky as an emblem of
the dialectic of absence and presence in poetry. He apparently accepts
Hölderlin's idea that God, as unknown, serves as a measure for the
poet. The concept of an unknown and perhaps unknowable measure
seems highly paradoxical. Yet Heidegger suggests that
The measure consists in the way in which the god who remains unknown,
is revealed as such by the sky. God's appearance through the sky consists
in a disclosing that lets us see what conceals itself, but lets us see it
not by seeking to wrest what is concealed out of its concealedness, but
only by guarding the concealed in its self-concealment. Thus the unknown
god appears as the unknown by way of the sky's manifestness.18
Heidegger makes the connection between this general schema for
understanding poetry and his historical concerns by noting that the
sense of this precarious measure is liable to be obscured in a time
given to an excess of precise calculation.
Since Heidegger's own later work is often charged with being exces-
sively loose, poetic, or metaphorical, it may be appropriate to see that
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one crucial dimension of these works is a meditation on the nature
of poetry and its place in philosophy (or thinking). If the thinker is
in the night he will make the night his own, and this will mean that
he will allow its highly charged language to speak for itself. This may
take the form of an explication of this language in poets like Hölderlin
and Trakl, or it may consist in retelling the story of philosophy by
suggesting that it in fact begins with more internal light than we suppose
and ends in a twilight which is as much spiritual as external. Heidegger's
meditations on the pre-Socratics are designed to make some of the
metaphorical richness of their thought real options once more, while
his conception of the obscurity of the metaphysics of presence which
culminates in Hegel and Nietzsche aims at exhibiting the lack of clarity
in so many philosophical assumptions about clarity. Just as the poet
of the night must think about the nature of poetry itself, so the night's
thinker will place philosophy's career within a framework of presence
and absence which is traditionally poetic. Perhaps this is why Heidegger
describes thinking and poetry as neighbors who are both close to and
distant from one another, like dwellers on adjacent mountain peaks.
Yet Heidegger's late work is not only a meditation on the fate of
poetry in what Hölderlin called dürftiger Zeit. It is also, like Trakl's
work as read by Heidegger, an attempt to restore the prophetic functions
of language. In his essay on Trakl's A Winter Evening (Ein Winterabend)
Heidegger says that the poem calls together the earth, heavens, mortals
and gods (the Geviert or four-fold). He does not mean that it represents
or symbolizes these four but that it actually brings about a place or
focus of their interplay. When Heidegger writes Die Sprache spricht
(language speaks) repeatedly, at least one of the repetitions must be
read not as Heidegger's words about language but as the voice of
language itself. Both poet and thinker pass from being producers of
texts to accessories in the revelation of a mystery. In Vico's terms both
are practicing divination. Awed by the otherness of the sky (now the
evening sky) they seek to perform a theurgic ritual in which their
individual roles will dissolve in the greater fact which their texts usher
in. To read one of Heidegger's later texts sympathetically is to follow
the rituals and be initiated into part of the gathering of the four-fold
oneself.
To recall the divination of Vico's primitive men is strange when
we are dealing with the late products of the evening of a culture.
One standard critical response to what Heidegger is attempting would
be to recall Vico's critique of the crudity and vagueness of primitive
divination and metaphor as well as his sense of their potential riches.
In fact this is roughly Hegel's critique of symbolic and metaphorical
poetry which may very well have been written with Hölderlin in mind
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Such a simple identification of Heidegger with Vico's primitives will
not work, however. That there are parallels, perhaps suggesting a recorso,
is evident from the concern with the sky and the revealing/concealing
metaphorical language appropriate to it and the gods. Yet Heideggerian
divination occurs through texts which are not only self-conscious in
their textuality but which embody a complex reflection on the history
of philosophy and its relations with poetry. He has not simply reverted
to the beginnings of our tradition but has attempted a new beginning
which takes account of the fact that what we think of as our history
has already run its course. In the one text which Heidegger has published
in the format conventionally assigned to poetry he says, "To think
is to confine yourself to a single thought that one day stands still like
a star in the world's sky." 19 To accuse Heidegger of a vague and indefinite
longing for an unknown god is to neglect his own very clear sense
that the territory in which he is attempting to clear some ground is
full of unmapped impasses, tangles, and other dangers. For a single
thought to be visible like a star implies that its observers are otherwise
wrapped in the night. This star, like Trakl's flaming spirit and shining
colors, points a way for those who are not content with summing up
the achievements of the day and are not afraid to go wandering in
the night. Heidegger's thought in the world's sky is not the sun of
the Platonic and Hegelian analogies; it shines through the dark of
the world's night which can no longer be banished by the philosophical
sun. For Heidegger this complex of star and thought is no longer
merely a figure of a conceptual truth. Not only does evening alter
sense and image but it alters their relationship.
The strange and inverse parallelism in the Hegelian and Heideggerian
ways of dealing with the relations between philosophy and poetry can
be marked by thinking of the only poem Hegel is known to have
written, Eleusis. Addressed to Hölderlin and composed in 1796 (like
the "earliest system-program of German idealism"), it begins with the
poet's sense of the sublimity of the stars. As Geoffrey Hartman has
shown, it doubles the eighteenth century sense of the sublime—the
movement from being overwhelmed by natural size or power to a
conviction of one's own spiritual strength—by continuing a similar
movement within the spiritual world.20 Here Hegel, now elevated beyond
the stars, feels the weight of Greek culture, but overcomes his temporary
sense of belatedness by his will to interpret; in Hartman's words it
marks the turn "from the sublime to the hermeneutic." Hegel could
not remain either with the stars or the Greeks.21 While he apparently
adhered to a program calling for the fusion of philosophy with myth
and poetry, his own poetry foreshadowed the move from poetic to
reflective thought which culminates in his pronouncement of the 1820's
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that "art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us
a thing of the past. Thereby it has lost for us genuine truth and life,
and has rather been transferred into our ideas instead of maintaining
its earlier necessity in reality and occupying its higher place."22 Hegel's
move from poetry to philosophy occurs through a turn from the eternal
stars to the logic of human history. Heidegger's repudiation of the
eternal is at least as intense as Hegel's but he suggests the possibility
that the historical and the human ought not to be automatically identified.
Heidegger attempts to show that there is a history of being (Geschick)
as well as a human history (Geschichte). To dwell on the star in the
night of this history propels us into neither the eighteenth century
sublime nor the Hegelian hermeneutic because the night and the star
retain some of their facticity and opacity. For Hartman it is the strength
of the Hegelian approach that it asserts the humanization of art. I
have tried to show that even for Hegel the results of such absolute
humanization are ambivalent and tend, in dialectical fashion, to under-
mine themselves when he speaks of what it is to have attained such
an end or hazards language that might be appropriate to it. The strength
of hermeneutics, as Hegel knew, leads to art's dissolution within
philosophy and to philosophy's self-announced end. Heidegger, having
moved away from the almost perversely scholastic assault on the meaning
of being that was to have been initiated by Being and Time, reverses
the Hegelian sequence. If the alternatives suggested by his work—listen-
ing for the speaking of language, the poetizing of philosophy, and
dwelling on the revealing /concealing blueness of the night sky—are
still indeterminate, they fill a gap which would otherwise be occupied
only by the "pensive head" of Hölderlin's poem which "contentedly
reckons gain and loss at home."23
University of Kansas
1.G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. Knox (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1945), pp. 12-13.
2.Josiah Royce, Lectures on Modern Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964),
pp. 147-56. M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism (New York: Norton, 1971), pp.
225-37.
3.Hegel's Aesthetics, translated by T. M. Knox (New York: Oxford University Press,
1975), vol. II, pp. 1064-65.
4.Goethe, Faust, Part One, 11, 2038-39.
5.G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, translated by J. Sibree (New York: Dover
Books, 1956), p. 280.
294Philosophy and Literature
6.Hegel's Aesthetics, vol. II, p. 974.
7.The Philosophy of History, p. 103 (I have slighdy modernized Sibree's translation).
8.Brod und Wein, stanza 1.
9.The Philosophy of History, p. 103.
10.G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, translated by J. B. Baillie (New York:
George Allen and Unwin, 1949), pp. 149-60.
11.The Phenomenology of Mind, pp. 158-59.
12.I have analyzed this development in "Hegel's Dialectic of Artisdc Meaning," Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Fall 1976.
13.Paul de Man, "The Intentional Structure of the Romantic Image" in H. Bloom,
ed. Romanticism and Consciousness (New York: Norton, 1970), p. 69.
14.Martin Heidegger, "Die Sprache im Gedicht," in Unterwegs zur Sprache. I have
sometimes used the translation by Peter Hertz in On the Way to Language (New York:
Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 159-98. There is a valuable article with references to
the German literature by Karsten Harries on Heidegger's essay. See "Language and
Silence: Heidegger's Dialogue with Georg Trakl," Boundary 2, Winter 1976, pp. 495-511.
15."What Are Poets For?" ("Wozu Dichter?") in Poetry, Language, Thought, translated
by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
16.Maire Jaanus Kurrik, Georg Trakl (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
17.Hegel's Aesthetics, vol. I, pp. 402-21. I have discussed the contrast which Hegel draws
between metaphorical and dialectical poetry in "Hegel on the Meanings of Poetry,"
in Philosophy and Rhetoric, Spring 1975.
18.". . . poetically man dwells . . ." (". . . dichterisch wohnet der Mensch . . .") in
Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 223.
19."The Thinker as Poet" ("Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens") in Poetry, Language,
Thought, p. 4.
20."From the Sublime to the Hermeneutic" in The Fate of Reading (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 1 14-23.
21.Heidegger has criticized Hegel's interpretation of Greek philosophy as a stage in
the development to absolute spirit in "Hegel und die Griechen" in Wegmarken (Frankfurt
A.M.: Klostermann, 1967), pp. 255-72.
22.Hegel's Aesthetics, vol. I, p. 11.
23.Work on this paper was assisted by Kansas University Research Grant 3799-2038.
I am also grateful to The School of Criticism and Theory, and especially to Ralph
Freedman, for support and encouragement in my work on this paper.
